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INTRODUCTION
The study of Malaysian politics today is the study of its ruling
Alliance Party for the Party is the government and the government is
the Party.

Since the outset of Malayan independence in 1957 and through

the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963t the Alliance Party
has been the dominant ruling party controlling both chambers of parlia
ment.

The fusion of three ethnic parties— the United Malays National

Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)— representing the three major ethnic
groups in the nation— Malay, Chinese and Indian— is perhaps the singular
most frequently cited attribute of its success thus far.
In the following study, my interest lies less in the structural
facets of this formidable entity as in its functional aspects, speci
fically as they relate to the process of political integration.

Due

consideration, however, is given to structural analysis as it relates
to the functioning of the Party.
"The integration problems faced by new nations," posits Myron
Weiner, "should be viewed as part of an historical process of political
development through which Western political systems have gone as well."
Nonetheless, such problems do constitute a phenomenal challenge to any
ruling party, especially one that professes to adhere to democratic
principles.

And they are compounded in the Malaysian case by the mul-

^Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development,"
The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science. Vol. 35^
(March 1965), P» 52.
1
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tiethnic composition of the social system attended by lingual, religious
and other cultural variances.

Economic disparities, almost invariably

cutting along ethnic lines, serve only to exacerbate the delicate ethnic
relations and further complicate the process of attaining political
integration, a realization imperative in determining the viability of
not merely the Party, or the economy, or any single ethnic group but
of the nation as an entirety.
In putting the Malaysian integrational problems into analytical
perspective, one cannot overlook the role played by the British in
shaping the past which bears on the present and will persist into the
future, for history has a way of leaving in its path both erasable
scratches and more permanent scars.

And these scars are the fuel that

keeps Malay nationalism smouldering.
The Malay nationalists vent their grievances against the British
not only on the basis of the latter's administrative usurpation of their
motherland but, also, in view of their role in mobilizing the Chinese
and Indians, educationally and economically, well in advance of the
majority of the Malays.

Retrieving the helm from the colonialists was

interpretable to the nationalists as a means of restoring economic and
educational rights and opportunities to the indigenous.
To follow this vein of argument, the Alliance Party as a concept
is discordant with nationalist objective.

The Chinese, especially,

should be contained as they have been in Indonesia, not incorporated
into a political concert.

In theory, Article 153 of the Malaysian

Constitution does make provision for the special rights of the Malays
but, in theory as well as in practice, the government, embodied in the
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Party, is committed to granting equal rights to all ethnic groups.
Already, many nationalists are disillusioned hy the disparity between
theory and reality and members are falling out of Party ranks.

In the

language of Mosca, the Party will have to construct an effective poli
tical formula to sustain its organization and support for its quest
for political integration.
From the vantage point of non-Malays, the Alliance Party is, unequivocably, controlled by its Malay branch— the UMNO.

While there have

been a few Chinese and Indians serving in the Cabinet, the Prime Minister
and Deputy Prime Minister have been and will continually be, hand-picked
from the Malay contingent.

The effort to assign Malays to top admini

strative positions seems only too conspicuous.

A good proportion of

non-Malays, particularly the Chinese, are leary of oppression despite
the repeated assurance of equitable treatment pronounced by Party
leadership.

ThiB apprehension, with its various manifestations, poses

another problem and has to be arrested, or at least allayed, before
political integration could materialize.
There are several other presently or potentially obstructive ele
ments to the process of attaining and maintaining political integration.
Some questions readily provoke the mind at this juncture.

First, has

political integration of the political culture been achieved to any
significant degree by the Alliance Party?

If it has, what are the

factors or attributes of the Party that have contributed to such attain
ment and will this integration be sustained?

Further, what are the

elements of prime consideration for facilitating such sustenance?
Secondly, perhaps more basic than the previous, is the question as to
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whether political integration of any significant degree and viable
nature is attainable by the Alliance Party, given the breadth and width
of its politics and political leadership.

Thirdly, yet most fundamen

tal, is whether political integration for Malaysia is at all achievable
regardless of whichever party is in the cockpit.
explored in the ensuing study.
are investigated:

Answers to these are

More specifically, the following areas

1) inter-ethnic integration; 2) intra-ethnic integra

tion; 3) elite-mass integration; and 4) territorial integration.
Research for the study was based primarily on library materials—
hooks and articles dwelling on theories of integration and on political
parties, and those limited resources that directly pertain to Malaysia.
The scarcity of data on Malaysia proved to be more constricting than I
had anticipated prior to undertaking the project.

I tried to be cautious

so as not to distend the pieces of information available while putting
them to full use as an analytical base.
The rationale for the ensuing study germinates from my concern with
the future of Malaysia, where I came from and where I plan to return
upon completion of my study at Western Michigan University.

While many

economists have marvelled at the country's economic development, there
are those in other capacities who have expressed skepticism in regard
to the nation's future, not excluding Malaysian nationals.

It is hoped

that this modest undertaking would be perceived not merely as a con
tribution to knowledge about the country in particular and political
science in general but also, within the realm of objectivity, as an
exercise of faith in the nation's potentialities.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE CONCEPT OP POLITICAL
INTEGRATION
The usage of the terra 'political integration' has been no less
than inconsistent, with its meaning expanded or delimited to fit into
the analytical framework of individual authors.

In application, the

term has been associated with the concept of political development and,
like the latter, a succinct definition is hard to generate that would
embrace all its common and inferred meanings.
With this note of caution, it is the purpose of this chapter to
explore the various applications and implications of political inte
gration as perceptualized by different authors in their respective
studies.

Discussion will invariably gravitate toward the topical area—

Malaysia— and it is hoped that, in the process, an operational defini
tion of the concept could be constructed for subsequent analyses of
political integration in the milieu of the Malaysian political system.

Meanings of Political
Integration
The elusiveness of political integration as a concept emanates,
perhaps, from the elusiveness of the word 'integration' itself. One
1
dictionary, for instance, equates 'integrate' with 'desegregate'.
But, as the American case has demonstrated, desegregating white or

^The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, s.v.
"Integrate".
5
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black schools does not automatically foster integration beyond the
numerical

equality between blacks and whites in a given school, although

the relocation of individuals may encourage integrative behavior that
could eventuate in integration.
In Malaysia, equating integration with desegregation poses a some
what unique problem.

Democracy in that nation is manifested by giving

each ethnic group the liberty to set up vernacular schools.

These

schools are not, in principle, segregationist as there are no known
stipulations barring the admission of members of other ethnic groups.
But, by their very nature, they would attract primarily members of that
ethnic group to which they accrue.

To desegregate such schools is an

unmitigated form of ending vernacular education and freedom of ethnic
expression.

And, for the Chinese and Indians, this would be ominous

of what they have had, in their pessimism, anticipated— oppression by
the Malays.

Instead of allaying skepticism and cultivating integration,

a move to that effect would only impregnate the germs of fear and hos
tility.
Karl Deutsch, in several of his works, is an unabashed exponent
of communications as a means toward integration or community of attitudes.

1

A common language is, ostensibly, a logical instrument to

facilitate communications, and a common language for a new nation just
relinguished from the clutches of colonialism would preferably be one

1

For a more detailed discussion, refer to Karl Deutsch, Nationalism
and Social Communications: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1953) and The Nerves of Government;
Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press
Glencoe, 1963), passim.
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to assume the premanent role of a national or official language.
Edward Shils, in writing ”0n the Comparative Study of the New States,"
observes that "the official and the cultural use of the indigenous
languages is felt to be necessary to their national dignity; to go on
using a foreign language is regarded as an act of self-derogation."^
By process of elimination, India instituted Hindi as its official
language.

In Indonesia, Soekarno translated nationalist sentiment into

the realization of Indonesian as the national language, compelling
the Chinese to accept that decision.

In the case of Malaysia, Shil's

observation may be an accurate representation of nationalist preference.
However, with its persistent tradition of vernacularism and with the
English legacy indubitably a part of the nation's lingual scenario,
the implementation of the national language— Malay— has been crippled
by the lack of cooperation or the will to cooperate among non-Malays.
And, even among most Western-educated Malays, there is a tacit acceptance
that it is more intellectually and socially impressive when English is
employed as the medium of communication.
Fortunately, as other writers with different theoretical persuasions
would contend, there are other formulae for political integration.
Lucian Pye, for one, argues that national integration must be preceded
by personality integration followed by political development and modernization.

2

The assessment of personality integration, hcvjevei, involves

the intricate study of individual beings, permeating into the realm of

^Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States," in
Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: The Free
Press, 1963), p. 3A

Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962), passim.
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psychology.

For present purposes, especially, the concern is with the

integration of several ethnic groups historically situated in a specific
political culture.
A political culture, by definition, "consists of the system of
empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situ
ation in which political action takes place."^

These beliefs, symbols

and values are embodied in individuals who are members of discrete,
and in the case of Malaysia, competingv ethnic groups.

In certain

cultures, the disparities between ethnic groups are accentuated by
accidents of history which tend to favor one ethnic group above another.
For such a culture, then, what is political integration and what brings
it about?
Obviously, in a case like Malaysia, there are some extant binding
factors that have sustained the political culture.

Thus, it would be

more appropriate to perceive integration, as suggested by Philip Jacob
and Henry Teune, in relative rather than absolute terms.

In short, a

political culture is either less integrated or more integrated than
desirable for stability.

Political integration, to use yet another

phraseology, is a concept of rank.

2

As a phenomenon, political integration is also multifaceted.
Myron Weiner, in "Political Integration and Political Development,"

'j

Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, 111.:
The Dorsey Press, 1967)» P* 1*
2

Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integration Process: Guide
lines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community^" in The Inte
gration of Political Communities, ed. Philip E. Jacob And James V.
Toscano (New York:J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), P* 10*
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introduces five facets:

(1) national integration; (2) territorial

integration; (3) value integration; (4) elite-mass integration; and
(5) integrative behavior.^

National integration involves the process

of establishing a national identity attainable, as has been argued by
Clifford Geertz, by modifying, at least, if not transcending primordial
sentiments.

Specifically, Weiner indicates two public policy strategies

for the achievement of national integration, both of which have been
more often used complementarily than exclusively in almost all nations:
1) The elimination of the distinctive cultural traits
of minority communities into some kind of a 'national'
culture, usually that of the dominant cultural group
— a policy generally referred to as assimilationist....
2) The establishment of national loyalties without
eliminating subordinate cultures— the policy of
'vanity in diversity'....
The problem of territorial integration shifts from the subjectivity
of individual feelings towards the nation to the objectivity of control
over the entire state.

The central authority of the Philippines is

experiencing difficulty, presently, in extending effective control,
except by martial force, to the outer islands where its larger Moslem
populace is constellated.

These people feel a greater affinity with

Indonesia and Malaysia where Islam is a salient religious force.

West

Pakistan has experienced a turbulent resistance to territorial integra
tion that has led to the secession of its Eastern flap forming what is
now Bangladesh.

The disjunction between Singapore and the rest of the

Federation of Malaysia that led to its disengagement in 1965 was the

1
Weiner, op. cit., pp. 53—542
Loc. cit., p. 56.
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culmination, in effect, of failure to achieve the level of territorial
integration that would provide the central authority with both de jure
and de facto legitimacy over that region.
Over a decade since its inception, Malaysia is still confronted
by a peculiar problem pertaining to territorial integration.

While

there has been no overt expression by its Eastern territory (comprised
of Sabah and Sarawak) to resist control by the central authority, there
is a tendency among mainland Malaysians as well as non-Malaysians to be
evasive about that part of the Federation.

For historical reasons,

relatively little has been learned about Eastern Malaysia.

Mainland

Malaysia— Malaya— is the heartland of the Federation, the locus of most
if not all of its major social, economic and political activities.
The development lag of the East in the social, economic and political
arena, already conspicuous, is inadvertently exacerbated.

And the

four—hundred miles or so of water separating the two regions has not
made much positive contribution to mental outlook:

many Easterners

coming to the mainland feel or are made to feel that they have emerged
from Appalachia into Manhattan.

By the same token, Western Malaysians,

assigned to work in the Eastern territory, must be pacified with liberal
fringe benefits.
Obviously, this manifestation of bigotry, whether deliberate or
otherwise, on the part of the Westerners has to be terminated or it
may be inculcated in the minds of their Eastern counterparts that they
have been consciously treated as second-class citizens.

Their reaction

to this awakening will likely be detrimental to the cause of unity.
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President Soekarno

1

and hxs sympathizers had once tried to obstruct

the merger of this region with the mainland and it took a United Nations
commission to reveal the will of the people to partake in the union.
Persistent territorial alienation, however, may well spur an attitudinal conversion among some, perpetrating another political collision;
this, Malaysia, with its other internal strifes, cannot contain or
endure.
A frequently cited aspect of political integration is the bridging
of the elite-mass gap.

Leonard Binder contends that the achievement of

national integration requires the closing of the gap between the elites
and the non-elites.

2

Shils alludes to a similar problem when he cate

gorizes as observable disjunction in the new states the cleavage between
the uneducated masses and the intellectuals.^

Samuel P. Huntington, in

arguing that the pre-condition of political stability is the bridging of
the rural-urban gap, is microscoping, in effect, the elite-mass problem
of integration.^
The elite-mass polarity is compounded in the differences in goals
and values between those who govern and those who are governed.

The

emergence of a middle-class would fill in the interval between the
extremities serving as a "behavioral and ideological synthesis of

1

years.

Soekarno was the President of Indonesia for almost twenty-two
He was stripped of his powers on March 12, 1967.

2

Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, no. 3 (September 1964)*
p . 627.
^Shils, op. cit., p. 3.
^Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), passim.
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historical values and the values associated with modernity."^

Generally,

the concern with this problem invokes the creation of such infra-struc
tures as political parties, newspapers and universities,and others that
could provide the kind of reciprocity in communication to link the elite
and the masses.2
The problem of elite-mass integration as observable in Malaysia
cuts acress ethnic lines in that there is greater convergence between
the elites of the different ethnic groups than between the elites and
masses intra-ethnically.

However, primordial sentiments do play a

distinct role in creating or sustaining the existing gap.

The elites

who advocate the emulation of Western industrialism and modernization,
for instance, run counter to the conservationist propensity of its rural
masses.

To mobilize their own developmental efforts, the elites have

the elemental task of reconciling religious traditionalism with modernism
and educating the masses in this regard.

This is especially warranted

for rural Malays, among many of whom the interest on capital borrowings
or savings is still regarded as usury.
In Malaysia, there are at least three categories of elites vying
for mass support— the Western-oriented ruling elites, the modern rising
elites, and the parochial.

All three categories of elites try to mobi

lize or rally sympathy from the masses to the tune of their goal values
approximate one another's.

The Western-oriented ruling elites include

in their midst the various ethnic groups.

The staunch nationalists, not

able to tolerate this form of affiliation that tends to keep Malay

^Binder, op. cit., p. 630.
Seiner, op. oit., p. 62.
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progression under check and balance, are increasingly aligning them
selves with those leaders who have gained following through religious or
provincial appeal.

The modern rising elites are, generally, young and

ambitious, usually the product of non-elite families.

With sophistica

tion of education and faculty, they cultivate their own political idea
tion, channeling stamina and imagination into such organizations as the
Peoples' Justice Party and the Democratic Action Party.

Thus, achieving

substantial elite-mass integration for this nation is a more complex
task than it would appear at first blush, particularly for the ruling
elites.
To the present extent of discussion, only the various aspects of
integration have been infused into the analytical context while a
definition of political integration has yet to grace the theoretical
framework.

To reiterate, precision of definition is hardly conceivable

of a phenomenon that is at once empirical and obscure.

With cautionary

remarks about its limitations, Jacob and Teune offer the following for
definition:
Political integration generally implies a relationship
of community among people within the same political entity.
That is, they are held together by mutual ties of one kind
or another which give the people a feeling of identity and
self-awareness. Integration, therefore, is based on strong
cohesiveness within a social group; and political integration
is presenjj; when a political-governmental unit of some sort is
cohesive.
To other writers, political integration entails some varied defi
nitions.

1

Ernst Haas perceives the concept as:

Jacob and Teune, op. cit., p. 4°
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a process whereby political actors in distinct national
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expec
tations, and political activities toward a new center,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over
the preexisting nation state.1
And to the great exponent of the cybernetic model— Karl Deutsch
— integration of individuals in a society is measurable by "their
ability to receive and transmit information on a wide range of different
topics with relatively little delay or loss of relevant detail."

2

In general, it has become apparent that most writers are inclined
to approach the concept of integration from the standpoint of the pro
blems leading to its attainment as the phenomenon is complex and,
virtually, theoretically inexhaustible.

Accordingly, it is more commonly

found that, in the literature of political science, problems and/or
aspects of political integration are expounded more incisively than
the pure concept of political integration.

The reason for this, as has

been hinted at the outset, is that political integration is such a
multidimensional phenomenon that it would be presumptuous and inaccurate
to suggest that it pertains only and entirely to the limited theoretical
area of any single writer.
Factors Influencing Integrative Behavior

If integration is understood as the state of cohesiveness, then
integrative behavior refers to the 'human' process leading to that
cohesion.

One could wonder:

What are the factors that are presently

^Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and
Economic Forces (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958),
cited by Ake, op. cit., p. 12.
^Deutsch, op. cit., p. 151«
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operating and potentially of utility in :fostering integration?
Ostensibly, there are many variables that may emit integrative
behavior.

Ake enumerates the following ten:

(l) geographical proximity;

(2) homogeneity; (3) transactions, or interactions, among persons or
groups; (4) knowledge of each other; (5) shared functional interests;
(6) the character or motive pattern of a group; (7) the structural
frame or system of power and decision-making; (8) the sovereigntydependency status of the community; (9) governmental effectiveness;
■j

(10) previous integrative experiences.
An enumeration such as the above, however, provides very little
clue as to the formula for political integration:

What proportion or

combination of which factors is required and would suffice in eliciting
a desired or desirable amount of integration? Would the absence of one
influencing factor in a political system deny that system the chances
for integration, or would a different mix of factors be devisable?

Is

there a rank order of significance among the factors?
These questions are not irrelevant in studying any society especially
one that is making a quest for integration.

In Malaysia, for instance,

one could hypothesize that there would be a higher degree of political
integration currently if it were a more homogenous nation.

But, this

is not the same as pronouncing that, given the extent of its hetero
geneity, the desirable level of political integration is not achievable,
not unless ft is presumed that homogeneity is the necessary precondition
for such •:.ainment.

Ake makes the encouraging contention that ”it is

^Ake, op. cot., pp. 11-12.
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possible for a political system to achieve a level of integration quite
1
out of proportion to its cultural homogeneity."
Weiner enunciates that integrative behavior, essential in complex
modern societies, is manifested in the willingness of individuals to
work complementarily and in an organized manner towards common goals.
It must be noted that this behavior has to be precipitated by political
socialization, defined by Robert Levine as "the means by which indivi
duals acquire motives, habits, and values relevant to participation in
a political system."

In childhood, Levine indicates, there seems to be

three mechanisms involved in the acquisition of political orientations,
viz. imitation, instruction and motivation.

2

Such institutions as youth

movements, schools and universities, military forces and others serve
to socialize young adults and adolescents to a new political behavior
amenable to national goals.
In summation, the role of political socialization in precipitating
integrative behavior could be viewed through the vantage point of the
learning theory.

Like other forms of social behavior, integrative

behavior has to be learned and integration internalized.

The function

of such socialization in the new nations is the moral demain of the
political leaders:

how they relate to the masses and how the masses

relate to them and to political institutions determine the general
attitude towards politics and political identification.

1

Loc. cit., p. 2.

2
Robert Levine, "Political Culture and Social Change," m Old
Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz, p. cit., pp. 280-300.
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Indicators of Political Integration
Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune posit:
Political integration, defined roughly as a state of
mind or disposition to be cohesive, to act together, to be
committed to mutual programs, refers to more them one aspect
or dimension of behavior. It has no one best indicator.
The authors have implied the very real difficulty of identifying
indicators of political integration.
of thumb.

However, there may be a few rules

It seems a valid assumption, for instance, that a society

wherein the population is homogenous, or, at least, where there is
linguistic homogeneity, and the system of government is efficacious,
there is a proclivity to political integration.
would, perhaps, be the United States.

An illustrative case

There is yet another picture

of political integration or a situation that gives the semblance of
such integration.

The cohesiveness, in this instance, is extracted

by authoritarianism or a totalitarian form of government.

Examples

that could be cited would be the communist countries.
At this juncture, a distinction has to be drawn between cultivated
and coerced form of political integration.

The present concern is,

invariably, with cultivated integration, i.e., cohesion precipitated
by various processes of reinforcement that are not forcible.

This,

it would be contended, is a more demanding and more rewarding attain
ment than through the use of coercive tactics to evoke compliance with
the ideology of the ruling oligarchy.
While it is not easy to specify the indicators of political inte-

1

Jacob and Teune, op. cit., p. 10.
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gration, there may he relative facility in identifying the empirical
indicators of the degree of political integration.
following set:

Ake suggests the

(l) the legitimacy score; (2) extraconstitutional behavior

score; (3) political violence score; (4) secessionist demand score;
(5) alignment pattern score; and (7) authority scored

These indica

tors are, as the writer indicates, 'political' in nature.
others which are of different orientation.

There are

For instance, the presence

of economic integration would be conducive to integrative behavior
politically.
Another pertinent observation brought to attention by Ake is that
...within certain limits, the level of political inte
gration is determined by the degree of social integration
(the extent of the sharedness of values, goal preferences,
symbols of identity, modes of communication, such as lan^
guage, common experience, etc., among members of a society).
Social integration, like political integration, is the function of
socialization, the responsibility for which rests, in the new nations,
on the political leaders.
Re-examining the Concept

The brief survey of the meanings and implications of the concept
of political integration has revealed its various facets and related
aspects.

It would be maintained that political integration is the

highest level of cohesion attainable by a nation and that other forms
of integration are sub-levels and contributive factors to political
integration.

^Ake, op. cit., pp. 8-11.
2

Loc. cit., pp. 11-12.
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For different political systems, political integration is generated
by different means.

An authoritarian or totalitarian system will employ

coercive tactics to procure a semblance of political integration and
obedience to oligarchical ideology.

In a country professing to adhere

to the priniciples of democracy, the emphasis will have to be on more
legitimate even if less effective means.
In Malaysia, the struggle for the ultimate— political integration
— involves the containment of four problems of integration:
intra-ethnic, elite-mass and territorial.

inter-ethnic,

It may be concluded that,

for this nation, political integration means the disposition to cohe
sive behavior within and among the existing ethnic groups, between the
elite and the masses and among territories, transcending primordial or
regional sentiments, thereby manifesting political community.

How this

cohesion can be gestated and to what extent that it has will be the
contextual pursuit of the subsequent study.

Integration, Political Parties
and the Alliance

As the topic of the study would indicate, the process of integration
in Malaysia will be analytically correlated to the performance of its
political vanguard— the Alliance Party.

In this connection, a brief

mention seems appropriate in regard to the theoretical relationships
between political parties and political integration.
It has been variously argued that political parties are affected
by and, in turn, affect the problem of integration in a society.1

1Joseph LaPalorabara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and
Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1966), passim.
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The degree of this relationship is dependent upon the nature of the
preexisting issues in that society and the disposition of the indivi
dual party and party leadership.

It stands to reason that the deter-

minitive role would be played by the government or the party which has
assumed the governance of the polity.

The ruling elites may opt for

an overtly non-party system or any other party system, justified in the
name of integration, although it would be argued, on the premise of
cultivated integration, that only a pluralistic system could generate
significant political integration especially in a multiethnic culture.
Weiner and LaPalombara suggest that
...one way of coping with social diversity is to use forceful
means to suppress and eradicate it; another is to search out
institutional arrangements that will encourage dialogue,
unblock communications channels, keep political and govern
mental leaders on their toes, facilitate the articulation
and aggregation of conflicting interests and in these ways
create a sense of political efficacy while building national
unity out of ethnic diversity.^
The Alliance Party, faced with a multiplicity o^ fissures in the
Malaysian polity, has displayed an inclination to vacillate between
the two measures of containing the problems while the tencency to con
strain communications oftentimes prevail.
Political parties are, further, instrumental in the process of
political socialization, influencing the political values and attitudes
of the masses.

By implication, the party leaders who would execute

this functional responsibility must be mature and objective in their
political conduct.

The Alliance, being an incipient organization in

1

Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, "The Impact of Parties on
Political Development," loc. cit., p. 418.
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the history of political development, sometimes finds in its leaders
an absence of such exemplary virtues that renders its task to integrate
the polity a more horrendous one.
In the final analysis, what the Alliance faces is an agglomeration
of the problems enumerated by Weiner and LaPalombara, subsumed in this
case under the rubric of political integration.

It is this challenge

which has defied the Party's earlier deeds and persistently takes its
legitimacy to task.

The adequacy with which this political demand is

abated or disposed of will determine the viability of the nation, the
federation, and, of course, the Party.
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CHAPTER TWO
MALAYSIA: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
A brief discussion of the Malaysian social system is warranted
for elucidating the ensuing analyses.

It is a truism that, while

history has contributed pervasively and intractably to the present
configuration of the system, the cumbersome chronologies dating as
far back as 50,000 B.C. could not practicably be accomodated within
the limited space appropriable to the current task.

Eclectically, the

subsequent survey will be confined to such information as germane to
the immediate topical context, i.e., the Alliance Party and the process
of political integration.
The Makings of Pluralism
Malaysia's problems today are largely derived from the pluralistic
composition of its society.

It has been argued by some historians that

the success of that nation is, also, attributable to the pluralism that
was superimposed— myopically, it may be contended— on its relatively
homogenous setting of earlier times.

As expected, arguments to this

effect have been advanced primarily by Western writers and constitute
the kind of justification with which to extricate the colonialists for
their part in trapsmuting the Malaysian ethnic complex.

It may seem

tautological to counter such arguments with the proposition that Malaysia's
success is not because of its pluralism; rather, the environment naturally
influences the character of a society's development or, phrased differ22
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ently, development will have occured in Malaysia regardless of its
ethnic distribution but the nature of that development may be different
from that which is observable presently.
Because of its deterministic role in Malaysian politics, the
origins of pluralism in that society deserves some elaboration.

His

torians are agreed that Malaya had had contact with India and China
for many centuries before the mass immigration of Indians and Chinese
into the territory around the middle of the nineteenth century.

Most

of the early immigrants were concentrated in the area known as Malacca,
a prosperous harbor centrally located on the East-West trade route.
It was estimated that when the Dutch captured the territory from the
Portuguese in I64I there were between three and four hundred Chinese
residing there, and by the middle of the eighteenth century the Chinese
1

population had expanded to 2,161.
The Chinese immigrants came mainly from southern regions of China,
viz. Kwangtung, Fukien and Kwangsi.

They were generally dissatisfied

with the Manchu rulers, and migrated to different partr. of Southeast
Asia, leaving their families behind.

This first steady flow of migra

tion occured in the late eighteenth and around the turn of the nineteenth
century.

Then, with the outbreak of the civil war known as the Taiping

Rebellion, the Chinese fled en masse to escape punitive actions taken
by the government.
Malaya and Singapore were especially appealing to the Chinese,
and the Indians, because their trade was substantially expanding while

1N. J. Ryan, The Making of Modern Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur:
University Press, 1967)» pp. 113*

Oxford

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24

labor was scarce. By the middle of the ninteenth century, moreover,
the British had established their domination of the major areas of the
peninsula and opened the doors to the immigrants.

The discovery of more

new tin fields after mid-century encouraged a great influx of immigra
tion from China.

By about the second half of the nineteenth century,

the population of Chinese in the peninsula numbered some 25,000 while
that of the Malays totalled some 150,000.

1

The immigrants brought with them their customs and traditions;
with the Chinese came their secret societies and the overt rivalries
that attend such movements.

Clashes erupted not too infrequently at

the outset, and this has been identified by some as the reason why the
British were drawn into closer contact with the Malay states.

Rationally,

they could not have been expected to be passive by-standers while the
fightings in the tin fields escalate into a major threat to the sur
vival of the settlements.
Other historians directly or indirectly implicate the Malays for
having encouraged Chinese immigration to render services necessary for
the mobilization of economy, specifically in the area of tim mining.
This is however, as simplistic a rationale as that which attempts to
justify slavery in America on the premise that some Africans conspired
in the trading of slaves.

There have been further insinuations that,

had the Malays been more diligent and astute in instituting their own
economic development, Chinese immigrants would not have been widely
persuaded to exploit the labor opportunities.

This, again represents

^Loc. cit., pp. 112&117*
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a contention that hinges on circumstantial assumptions rather than
evidential particulars;

it prevaricates while disparaging the normative

values of that era.
Both the Chinese and the Indians of the new wave of migration
had considered themselves as transients; their singular objective was
to amass sufficient fortune to retire comfortably to their respective
homelands.

Thus, the Chinese, especially, felt little need to demon

strate more than the minimum loyalty to either the Malays or the British
and to be receptive to the native way of life.
repatriated, others

While many eventually

stayed back but found difficulty in converting

their attitude towards local authorities.

In short, there was genera

lized apathy among the immigrants towards Malayan affairs except where
they pertained directly to the survival of the respective communities
and the freedom of their employment.

There were so many of them that

they could exist in closely-knit self-contained groups pursuing their
ethnic modes of living.

In this respect, they have remained relatively

resistant to change unlike the earliest migrants who had permitted
themselves to be assimilated..
Why did the Chinese and Indians stay on in Malaya and other South
east Asian countries?

A compelling explanation is that the going was

good for them in the area while life at home was less favorable.

Where

they were, no coercion was applied to induce them to change their ways,
at least not until much later.

Perhaps they became acclimatized,

though not necessarily assimilated, to their surroundings, negating
their will to transplant themselves in their mother-lands.

The truth

underlying the decision could only be speculated, but, whatever it is,
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the Chinese and Indians chose to remain in the area permanently.

And,

for the politics of Malaya and those neighboring regions that were to
partake in the merger subsequently, this decision has had many chal
lenging ramifications.
Progress and Paradox: The
Pursuit of Nationhood

Malaysia is a federation born, tumultuously, in September 1963
with the merger of the eleven states of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and
North Borneo (Sabah).

The genetic idea for the merger has been attri

buted to Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, while
Tunku Abdul Rahman, then Prime Minister of Malaya, has been credited
with providing the impetus, earning himself the designation of 'Bapa
Malaysia’ or 'Father of Malaysia'. Amidst a polemic involving the
leaders of the Malayan Alliance Party and those of the ruling Peoples'
Action Party in Singapore, the latter was politely ejected from an al
liance that once appeared to be the quintessence of political synthesis.
Henceforth, Malaya is referred to as West Malaysia while Sabah and
Sarawak are collectively known as East Malaysia.
Malaya gained her independence in 1957 while Singapore, Sabah and
Sarawak were still under British reigns,

(in fact, the three countries

were only 'free' upon their inclusion in the merger.)

The leaders of

the Alliance Party were operant in the negotiation for and the ultimate
realization of independence for Malaya from the British colonialists
who had partaken in the affairs of Malayan territories as early as 1786.
It was with relative facility that Malaya retrieved her sovereignty,
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being spared the goriness experienced by its neighbors in India and
Indonesia.
From the outset, Malaya was beset by integrational problems, which
smoldered beneath the veneer of peaceful coexistence.

The constitution

which attended Malaya's declaration of independence was designed as a
bargain; the voting rights of the Chinese and other non-Malays were to
be augmented while the special rights of the Malays were to be guarded
under the provision of Article 153*

This concession was infused into

the constitution of Malaysia which is, in effect, a modestly revised
version of the constitution of 1957*
The special position accorded the Malays and extended to the other
'indigenous1 peoples of Sabah and Sarawak is rationalized on the grounds
that (1) they are the 'Bumiputras' or 'sons of the soil', and (2) the
Chinese, especially, are too far ahead economically that they will have
to allow time for the Bumiputras to advance to a competitive level with
them.

The British have written off the disparity in economic attain

ments between the non-Malays and the Malays as a consequence of the
former's entrepreneurship and the latter's indolence.

This was a poorly

disguised recourse to self-vindication for their lack of vision which
perpetrated this unfortunate reality doomed to have many political
ramifications.
In statistical terms, approximately 90 per cent of the vital
1
domestic capital formation comes from the Chinese.
The quoted figure

1
Derek Davies, "The Racial Balance Sheet," Far Eastern Economic
Review, Vol. LXV, no. 28 (July 10, 1969), P« 121.
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of M $986 as per capita income

for the nation is a deceptive extra

polation of the distinct variance in incomes for non-Bumiputras and
Bumiputras.

To elevate the living standard of the latter, the govern

ment has established agencies such as the Federal Land Development
Authority (FLDA), Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority (FAMA), etc.
If the names of these agencies carry a tone of ruralism, it is only
because about two-thirds of the population, and mainly Bumiputras, are
based in categorically rural areas.

In West Malaysia, for instance,

71.3 per cent of the population reside in rural areas of which 63.5
per cent are Malays, 26.2 per cent Chinese and 9.7 per cent Indians.
In contrast, of the 28.7 per cent of the population located in urban
areas, 58*5 Per cent are Chinese, and 12.8 per cent of the urban population.

2

It is significant that the agencies designated by the government

to assist the rural Bumiputras are being widely criticized for perpe
tuating their rurality.
The total population of Malaysia, accounted in 1970, is 10,650,000
accomodated in a land area of 128,430 square miles.

Approximately 85

per cent of the residents are situated in West Malaysia where the ethnic
composition is as follows:

53*2 per cent Malays, 35*4 per cent Chinese,

10.6 per cent Indians, and 0.8 per cent of other origins.^ The ethnic

1
Willard A. Hanna, Asia, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XIX, no. 6
(January 1971)1 P* 3«
2

1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Table XI, p. 30*
quoted in Alvin Rabushka, Race and Politics in Urban Malaya (Stanford,
California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1973), p. 24.
^1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Table VI, p. 27,
loc. cxi/* | p« 21*
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distribution for the entire Malaysia presents a slightly different
picture in terms of Sino-Malay numerical balance with the following
enumeration:

44*0 per cent Malays, 35*0 per cent Chinese, 11.0 per

cent Indians (including Pakistanis and Ceylonese), 8.0 per cent indigenous tribes people, and 2.0 per cent of other origins.

1

Drawing on

the statistical observation, Cynthia Enloe remarks that
Malaysian ethnic pluralism is not such that one ethnic
group stands out clearly above several obviously minor
ethnic groups, and thus the Malay political superiority
is constantly in danger of losing touch with social
reality.^
Malaysia operates as a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral
parliament.

There are nine traditional Malay rulers and the titular

heads of Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak constituting the Conference
of Rulers.

The Paramount Ruler (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) is nominated by

this Conference from among the nine traditional rulers to reign for a
period of five years.

The hereditary rulers wield minimal political

power but are accorded customary deference by conservationist Malays.
The Senate of Malaysia comprises 5& members— two each from the
thirteen states are elected while the remaining 32 are appointed by the
Paramount Ruler upon advisement of the Prime Minister.

The House of

Representatives has a membership of 144; 104 f*o» West Malaysia, 24
from Sarawak and 16 from Sabah.

West Malaysia conducted one general

election after its independence and prior to the merger; since its

Hanna, op. cit.
2

Cynthia Enloe, Multi-Ethnic Politics: The Case of Malaysia
(Berkeley, California: Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies,
University of California, 1970), pp. 116-117.
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inception, Malaysia has staged two such elections, the second of which
fomented an ethnic collision that mirrored the tottering political
framework and launched Malaysia into its third emergency rule since
1948.
The emergency declared in 1948 and lifted in i960 involved West
Malaysia and her effort to contain the communist guerillas who retreated
to the jungles upon termination of Japanese occupation and the return of
British administration at the end of World War II. The guerillas are
the vestigial forces of the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army; mainly
of Chinese origin, their number is estimated currently to be between
1,000 and 1,500 constellated in the thickets of the Thai-Malaysian
border, conducting sporadic attacks on the border patrols.
When plans for the merger approached a conclusion, Soekarno
instigated a massive 'confrontation' against the would-be Malaysian
territories alleging that the alliance was the brainchild of the im
perialists, thus prompting the declaration of emergency lasting from
1963 to 1966. Soekarno found many sympathizers, in both East and West
Malaysia, in the devout Malay communalists who had entertained the idea
of a Pan-Malaysian (or Greater Indonesian) union.

Loyalists to this

primordial concept still exist among the nationalists and pose a
challenge to the inter-communalism of the Alliance.
The third state of emergency was a direct consequence of the
communal violence which erupted in West Malaysia in May 19^9» following
an election wherein the opposition parties won a victory that made the
Alliance's position highly precarious.

The Prime Minister suspended

parliament and created an interim administration by the National
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Operations Council (NOC) headed by his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak.

Skep

ticism was expressed as to whether Malaysia was ever going to be returned
to parliamentary rule.

Tunku's subsequent resignation and his replace

ment by Tun Razak served little to allay the fears of the non-Malays
specifically; Razak does not have the reputation for being solicitous
vis-a-vis the latter.

But democracy was resurrected and parliamentary

rule resumed its course in 1971*
Despite the many political setbacks that could have thwarted its
growth, Malaysian economic progress has been no less than a model of
success.

The entrenchment of its economy in rubber and tin, of which

it has been a leading exporter, has made its prosperity look like a
delicately ephemeral accomplishment.

To demonstrate its dexterity

in managing the nation's livelihood, the government has taken measures
to diversify the economy, providing incentives in such areas as timber
and palm oil exportation.

Presently, Malaysia is the world's leading

exporter ol logs and sawn timber and palm oil and palm kernels.

The

Gross National Product for 1973 was estimated to be M $14,450 million,
presumably surpassing the 8 of 9 per cent annual growth anticipated
by the government at the end of 1972.

1

As educational advancement is imperative for societal amelioration,
the Malaysian government has taken positive strides in augmenting edu
cational facilities.

Children are given six years of free primary

education; in fact it is mandatory for all primary school-aged children
to be enrolled in a school if they are within walking distance of one.

1

''Malaysia,” Far Eastern Economic Review 1974 Yearbook, p. 206.
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It is estimated that 91»4 per cent of children in this age group are
currently enrolled.

The proportion, as expected, is inversely related

to the level of education.

Approximately 4*7 per cent of college age

youth are enrolled in institutions of post-secondary learning.^
In 1967» the Alliance government implemented Bahasa Malaysia
(Malay) as the national and official language in West Malaysia although
English is, in practice, widely utilized in official circles.

In 1970,

Bahasa Malaysia was introduced as the medium of instruction in all the
first grade classes of English medium primary schools.

It is the inten

tion of the government that, as this transformation is effected in
successive years, all English medium schools would eventually become
what are categorized as 'National Schools'.

2

By all counts, Malaysia's economic success and stability cannot
be defined as anything lower than exemplary.

The Alliance could jus

tifiably claim most if not all of the credit and flaunt this feat as
an administrative triumph.

But, a provocative question comes to mind:

Is this the stuff of which political integration is made?

It would be

contended that economic attainment per se has not fostered political
integration and is not likely to do so unless attended by other socio
cultural ameliorations.

That 'there is more tc- life than money* is not

a mere cliche in the context of Malaysian politics.

Inter-ethnic

cleavages cannot be cemented with concrete but with a political blend
of tangible achievements and a sense of security and efficacy.

The

riots of 1969 brusquely drove home this point to the political elites.

^Malaysia Year Book for 1972 (Kuala Lumpur:
1972), p. 345.
2

The Malay Mail Press,

Loc cit., p. 339.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ALLIANCE PARTI AND PARTY
POLITICS IN MALAYSIA
Although political parties are relatively recent phenomena in the
Malaysian cultural scene, political awareness had been elicited at a
much earlier turn in history.

For the Chinese in Malaya, Dr. Sun

Yat-Sen's visit in 1900 invoked their patriotism directed, invariably,
towards China.

The empirical evidence of his clout was the establish

ment of thirty branches of the Kuomintang soon after its formation in
1912.

For the Malays, the seeds of consciousness were strewn by re

turning students from Al-Azhar University in Cairo.

The vicissitudes

of Malay politics were marked by a shift from Islamic to more secular
orientation with increasing political verbalization by the students of
the Sultan Idris Training College which had been structured in 1922.
The 1930's witnessed the burgeoning of politico-cultural associa
tions representing Malay interests.

But, while the Malay-educated

intelligentsia were striving to mobilize their youthful energy into
moderately radical unions, some inspired by Soekarno's Indonesian Na
tional Party, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had already been
initiated and drawing a primarily Chinese following.

The party was

responsible for citing the trade union strikes of the 1930's.

It was

banned at the onset of the emergency of 1948» but the Labor Party,
formed three years later, had frequently been deemed the residual ele
ment of the MCP.

33
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Evolution of the
Alliance
The United Malays National Organization was founded in May 1946
by Data Onn bin Jaafar as a measure to protect Malay rights against
further encroachment by the British.

Since its inception, UMNO was

destined to influence the course of Malayan and Southeast Asian politics,
directly and indirectly.

A mere couple of months after its birth, for

instance, it attained a historic triumph by persuading the British to
jetison the Malayan Union proposition that would have levied a severe
curtailment of Malay liberty.

It earned another distinction, shortly

thereafter, as being the only political party represented on the Working
Committee preparing the basic draft of the Federation Agreement, the
foundation on which the Federation of Malaya was subsequently erected.
It is ironic that when Data Onn proposed to open membership of
UMNO to non-Malays, he encountered opposition serious enough to prompt
his resignation in 195^• He proceeded to form the Independence of
Malaya Party (IMP).

It was to contain the threat of the IMP in a 1952

local election that the Selangor branches of UMNO and MCA, which com
menced its activities in 19491 agreed to combine forces.

The victory

won by the 'alliance' in that and a subsequent election was so impressive
that what was initially a temporary conjugation for electoral expedient
was to be perpetuated henceforth as a national strategy.

In 1955* "the

MIC, which had been in existence since 1946, was drawn into the formal
Alliance which elected Tunku Abdul Rahman as president of its National
Council.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35

In the federal elections of 1955• the Alliance Party sponsored
52 candidates of which

were successful.

The only candidate who

suffered defeat succumbed to a member of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic
Party (PMIP) which emerged as a potentially formidable opposition to
the Alliance, appealing strictly to primordial sentiments.

The returns

of the 1955 elections were, nonetheless, a cogent victory to spur opti
mism.

In a joint manifesto that same year, the Alliance Party promised

independence for Malaya within four years.

As it turned out, with

assiduous effort on the part of the Alliance, independence was to be
realized only two years later in a congenial spirit of political suc
cession.
It is important to clarify that the Alliance which incorporated
three parties representing the three major ethnic communities had never
professed to be noncommunal in its political commitment.

Rather, it is

an inter-communal association and its success and failure should be
viewed in this light.
ties:

There is a host of purportedly noncommunal par

among the best known are the Democratic Action Party, the Labor

Party, People's Progressive Party, and Gerakan Raayat (People's Move
ment).

But, in all these parties, the extent of their noncommunalism

goes only as far as to include a few selected token figures from the
thin stratum of elites to project on image of ethnic pluralism.

Other

wise, they have demonstrably functioned in the interest of non-Malays,
mainly Chinese.

Then, there are parties that are ostentatiously communal,

and the prime exEimple in this category is the PMIP.
Jean Grossholtz says of political parties in Malaya that they
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...grow out of discussions and arguments over the relative
positions of the various communal groups. The form and
character of the government obviously would affect the
comparative advantage of each. Economic interests were
1
involved, but these interests too were communal in nature.

The Eastern Alliance
The complexion of party politics was altered slightly by the merger.
In Sarawak, the first political party was born as late as 1959*

This

was the Sarawak's United People's Party (SUPP) whose stated objectives
included the maintenance of racial harmony among the peoples of the
state.

2

From the outset of the Malaysian plan, SUPP implanted its

banner in opposition territory but mellowed sufficiently by the bloody
outbreak of 1969 "to step on the Alliance bandwagon in 1970.
Other

parties were subsequently formed in Sarawak.

Party Negara

Sarawak (PANAS), Sarawak National Party (SNAP), Barisan Raayat Jati
Sarawak (BARJASA), Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (PESAKA), and Sarawak Chi
nese Association evolved in the early 1960's and formed, the Sarawak
Alliance in 1963.
Chief Minister.

SNAP's leader, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, was appointed
However, following a cabinet crisis involving a volley

of charges between him and the central Alliance government, Ningkan was
dismissed.
tion since.

SNAP seceded from the Alliance and has remained in opposi
Also in 1966, BARJASA was dissolved and its members merged

with PANAS to form the present Party Bumiputra, affiliated with the
Alliance.

1

Jean Grossholtz, "The Rise and Demise of Konfrantasi: Impact
and Politics in Malaysia," Asian Studies, Vol. VI, no. 3 (December
1968), p. 328.
James P. Ongkili, Modernization in East Malaysia 1960-1970 (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 45.
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As for Sabah, no political party was in existence when the
Malaysia proposal was broached by Tunku Abdul Rahman in May 1961.

By

the end of that year, however, five parties were already in gear to
express interest and concern regarding their status in the merger.
After their apprehension had substantially been allayed, the United
National Kadazan Organization (UNKO), United Sabah National Organization
(USNO), Sabah National Party (SANAP), Pasok Momogun, and the Sabah
Indian Congress (SIC) converged to form the Sabah Alliance.
Ongkill posits that
Apart from the utilitarian objective of supporting
Malaysia, the Sarawak Alliance was constituted for
basically the same reasons that the Malayan Alliance was
founded in 1955*•••In the context of a multi-racial
society, many leaders soon realized that a non-communal
part could not possibly thrive as long as the electorate
thought communally.... The 1955 Alliance...introduced a
system whereby a number of communal parties were united
in a communal political organization. As a body of
parties which represented the major races in the country,
the Alliance hoped to rally behind it the largest number of
supporters...(promising) to give the greatest good and
hoped to gain the greatest number.1
The creed of the Sabah Alliance depicts a similar profile.
The formation of the two regional alliances affiliating with the
central governing body was a significant endorsement of the Alliance
Party's formula, boosting its legitimacy vis-a-vis the adversaries to
the merger.

But this endorsement was accompanied by a ponderous respon

sibility added to the extant constricting yoke on the back of the
central cadre.

Now, along with its other endemic integrational problems,

it will have to resign itself to the task of resolving the question of
territorial integration.
1

Loc. cit., pp. 49-50*
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Confidence in the Alliance Party was affirmed by the overwhelming
victory which it struck at the polls in 19641 winning 89 out of 104
seats in West Malaysia.

Soekarno's act of aggression was the primary

factor in rallying this massive support behind the Party.

The non-

Bumiputras were only too conscious of the primordial designs that the
Indonesian revolutionist and his sympathizers had conceived; if such
designs were permitted to materialize, the stature of the non-Bumiputras
would be reduced to political impotence.

It is unfortunate that only

during the existence of an external threat that Malaysians could make
a concerted effort toward inter-communal harmony; devoid of such
imminence, they have succumbed to their primitive instincts for inter
ethnic hostilities.
The Alliance Party, regretfully, is not without its frailties.
The government is, in effect, operated by the UMNO.

One would not be

too far removed from reality to suggest that the affinity between the
Alliance government and the Alliance Party is only to the extent that
the Party is the banner under which legitimacy is derived and elections
are won to return a miniscule clique within the Alliance to office.
To the untrained layman, the Party is easier perceived than the cadre.
But, power is wielded by that exclusive group of individuals and not
the Party.
The Alliance is, also, fraught with internal cleavages.
shall be discussed within the ensuing analyses.

These

It could safely be

argued at this turn that the Alliance Party is not securely integrated
and that its struggle for political integration is an uphill battle.
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Figure 1: THE ALLIANCE PARTY HIERARCHY IN THEORY
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Figure 2: THE ALLIANCE PARTY HIERARCHY IN PRACTICE
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Cynthia Enloe writes that
...in relatively homogenous societies, political parties
may be expected to give tacit assent to the society's
political norms in their own internal operations. But
they usually are not compelled to serve as models for
national integration. In multiethnic statesf expecially
during periods of insecurity, this role does fall to the
parties. Any political party which claims to be a poten
tial ruler is expected in its own organizational structure
to provide an integrative blueprint which the polity as a
whole can emulate.^
In this vein of argument, the Alliance as a party has a good amount
of introspection and self-absolution to conduct.

This is not saying,

however, that it lacks the potential for leading the polity to political
integration.

1

Enloe, op. cit., p. 103.
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CHAPTER POUR
TOWARDS POLITICAL INTEGRATION: THE
RECORD OP THE ALLIANCE PARTY
The political system is Malaysia predicated by the Alliance Party
may be categorized as ‘one-party pluralistic'.

By definition,

These are quasi-authoritatian systems dominated by a single
party which is pluralistic in organization, pragmatic rather
than rigidly radical in outlook, and absorptive rather than 1
ruthlessly destructive in its relationships to other groups.
LaPalombara and Weiner suggest that
it may be that by seeking to accomodate the conflicting
interests within a society the one-party pluralistic
arrangement may demonstrate a superior capacity to bring
^
about effective economic and perhaps political development.
Of economic development, the general prosperity of the country has
emerged as the most tangible achievement of the Alliance, and is, prima
facie, deserving of the generous compliments paid by interested observers.
Economic development, to a certain extent, is material evidence that
some degree of economic integration is in existence within the society.
And it has been argued that such integration is a positive step in the
direction of the higher level of integration.
In implementing its various economic policies as well as its poli
tical philosophy, however, the Alliance may have inadvertently vitiated
the

extant forces of integration.

On the one side, for instance, the

1Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "Origin and Development of
Political Parties," in Political Parties and Political Development,
op. cit., p. 38.
2

Loc. cit., p. 40«
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government is committed to its policy of laissez-faire, stimulating the
mobilization of the private sector.

This invariably augments the wealth

of the non-Malays who have had a headstart in business enterprise.
Furthermore, major industries are oftentimes established in the urban
areas where the majority of the populace are of non-Malay origin.

The

growth in the industrial sector, in short, deposits assets continuously
to the wealth already amassed by the non-indigenous.
As a countervailing measure, the government has begun setting up
several institutions such as the National Investment Corporation and
appropriating multiple forms of assistance to provide the momentum for
and eventually enhance the rural economy, thus generating substantive
incomes to the Bumiputras.

There is, however, a blemish that easily

eludes the uncritical eye; while the incomes accruing to the urban areas
are utilized for elevating the standard of living in that sector from
comfortable to increasingly more comfortable positions, those generated
in the rural areas are, for the most part, absorbed by the effort to
convey the sector to an acceptable level of subsistence.
Thus, while the economy as a whole has displayed an impressive
statistical progress, advancement for the populace has not been equitable.
It is not worth arguing that the rights of the indigenous could only be
protected and not innovated and that the non-Malays would only regard
1

their special position as a temporary quid pro quo.

Nevertheless,

it would certainly be presumptuous to expect the Bumiputras to achieve
in about a decade what the Chinese have accumulated for over a century.

1Jerorae R. Bass, "Malaysia: Continuity or Change," Asian Survey,
Vol. X, no. 2 (Feb. 1972), p. 154.
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As things stand presently, while theory holds that favoritism is
enjoyed by the Bumiputras and overt gestures are supportive of this
contention, growth in manufacturing, a partial euphemism for the nonMalay sector, has been a lucrative 17 per cent per annum for the period
1967-1970.

In contrast, the annual growth in agriculture for the years

between 1963 to 1971 averaged 6.8 per cent.

The Bumiputras of West

Malaysia have vterbalized their discontentment, alleging that the govern
ment has not been sufficiently firm and rigorous in affecting their
development.

The complaint from East Malaysia is that its Bumiputras

have been foreshadowed by those in the West in meeting the attention of
the central administration.

The non-Malays, meanwhile, resound their

cries of deprivation by the priorities accorded to the Bumiputras in
the economic field.
These centrifugal demands, pulling the government in three apparent
directions, are hardly the making of economic integration, less still
political integration.

The hierarchy of needs is the rational guideline

for responding to the competing demands.

J. M. Gullick identifies his

priority in the followihg argument:
It is necessary for political reasons to pour money into
improving the traditional peasant economy of the mass of the
Malay population and into developing the backward Borneo
territories. Only if these sectors of Malaysian society feel
that the government is striving to narrow the gap between them
and the modern, urban sector will multi-racial, federal
Malaysia hold together.
The development of East Malaysia is imperative if the Alliance is
to achieve a significant measure of territorial integration.

^J. M. GuILick, Malaysia (New York and Washington:
1969), P. 224.

The

F. A. Praeger,
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amelioration of Malay peasant economy is also necessary to instil faith
and evoke the willingness of the community to attain inter-ethnic inte
gration.

However, the 'constant pie' syndrome is prevalent and the same

factors that foster integration on one level are prone to its destruction
on another.
The paradox does not end here.

Since its inception, a covenant

made hy the Alliance has been to mobilize political participation in
Malaysia.

True to its wordB, all ethnic groups have since been widely

enfranchised.^

But the immediate result of this expanded participation

by the respective ethnic groups in the political process is derogative
from the intention with which it was brought to bear.

Instead of pro

moting, it has undermined Malaysian national unity as opposition parties
are increasingly able to draw competitive support from those individuals
and associations who approach the political system for rewards and
assistance.^

In effect, the wider political participation has worked against
the diverse efforts of the Alliance to achieve a healthy level of inte
gration.

And, as if politics itself has been less than demanding, many

areas that are generally in themselves apolitical have been entrenched
in politics by virtue of being the discriminating factors of ethnicity.
Language and education are, inter alia, the. pressing issues confronting
the government.
1
It was estimated by B. Simandjuntak in Malayan Federalism 1945-1963
(Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1969)1 P* 69, that
85-90 per cent of the potential electorate in Malaya have been registered
as voters. It could be assumed that the estimation for the entire feder
ation would not vary too widely from his quotation.
2
Enloe, op. cit., p. vxi.
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Critical Choices for Integration

In a modernizing country, education is an imperative vehicle for
transporting the polity from the state of ascription-oriented to that of
achievement-oriented, from traditionality to modernity.

The Alliance

government presently allocates about 20 per cent of its annual budget
to the cause of education.

By providing free primary education, the

government demonstrates its capacity to move expeditiously towards
development.
Education, however, does have its implications that are not neces
sarily ingratiating to the ruling elites.

Huntington posits that

...in virtually all modernizing countries no government can
count for long on support from the intellectual community.
If there is any cleavage which is virtually universal in
modernizing countries, it is the cleavage between government
and universityJ
Prior to the establishment of the University of Malaya in the
federal capital— Kuala Lumpur— in early 1962, higher education for
Malaysians was catered to by the University of Malaya in Singapore,
since renamed the University of Singapore.

In 1969 and 1970, the Uni

versity of Penang and the National University respectively came into
existence.

While neither of the latter two institutions waB in the

position to involve itself in the events of the last federal elections,
1969 witnessed the emergence of the student body of the University of
Malaya, particularly the Malay faction, as an interest articulation
group.

1
Huntington, op. cit., p. 371*
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Also taking an historic step towards an overtly active role in
politics were the students of the Mara Institute of Technology (ITM),
an institution dedicated to providing higher vocational education to
Bumiputras.

Their mobilization into political participation, even

before reaching the eligible age for voting in most instances, has a
significant implication on the inter-ethnic integrative effort of the
Alliance government.

It seems that the Party has arrived at that in

evitable stage in progress when it is to be confronted by hard core
resistance among the very individuals it has nurtured for societal
development.
When the Alliance first formed the independent government, it
placed a high expectation on being able to integrate the younger educable generation.

By 1969* however, it was obvious that, coincidentally

perhaps, it had been reinforcing latent communalism.

The rallying calls

of the students were in support of Malay interests (or non-Malay interests)
and not those of the Party.
But to try and quell such unrest and assure future non-violence
could easily invoke authoritarianism.
delicate terrain:

The Alliance has to tread on

ii cannot afford to suppress the dynamism of intel

lectual pursuit; equally important is the need to de-socialize the
individuals who constitute the most fertile source for political recruit
ment.

To impose its formula for inter-ethnic integration could well

provoke the wrath of its intelligentsia in proportions it could not
effectively contain.

Yet, to let them proceed with their communalist

views unmodified is to acquiesce the permeation of destructive impurities
into the political culture.
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As in the case of the economy, educational development has not
yielded for the Alliance the political integration to which it aspires.
A closer look at certain policies of the Party is in order so that they
might explicate the nature of the drawbacks.
The Alliance, from the outset, has been imbued with the concept of
Malaysianizing its public sector.

It has also promulgated a quota system

whereby the recruitment in the social services is to be in the ratio
of four Bumiputras to one non-Malay.

To convert its dream into reality,

the educational facilities have had to be expanded to allow more of its
educable adolescents the opportunity for higher and better education.
As in colonial times, however, educational centers are constructed
in urban areas, where they are more accessible to non-Malays.

It is

reported that, as recently as 1966-1967, 70 per cent of the students
enrolled in the university were of non-Malay origin.

1

Subsequently, a

quota system for the university intake was proposed by Dr. Mahathir
Mohamed (who later became a key opposition figure against Tunku Abdul
Rahman's political stance).

It has, ostensibly, been seriously espoused,

for the proportion of Malay students in the University of Malaya had
increased to 43*73 per cent by the 1971-1972 academic session.

2

The numerical gain does little in the way of attracting the Malays
to either the Alliance or the non-Malays.

To begin with, the increment

in their numbers has expanded only their ethnic student body in the
non-science departments; the areas of science, engineering and medicine
remain almost totally dominated by non-Malays.

Since qualification in

1

Milton E. Esman, Administration and Development in Malaysia
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 22
2

Malaysia Year Book for 1972, op. cit., p. 351*
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the latter disciplines furnishes the individual with more rewarding
compensations, both in terms of salary and social status, the Malays
persistently feel that the government has been dilatory in safeguarding
their interests in the realm of education.
Under all these centrifuging circumstances, it is difficult to
objectively gauge whether the polity, in terms of political integration,
has thus far progressed or regressed.

Regardless of this assessment,

the realities are strongly indicative of the fact that the ultimate
integration is not to be attained by random successes in disparate areas
but by the generalized and synthesized development in all the relevant
facets of the political culture.
It must be conceded that the Alliance is working against great odds.
The political culture willed to it by the British was marred by many
fissures cutting across and along ethnic lines.

Secondly, the leaders

of the Alliance belong to a small class of the privileged in education,
wealth and political knowledge, persuading observers to conclude that
they have more in common with each other than with the communities they
purportedly represent.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the Party is

fraught with internal disparities that exude contradictions to the
goal of political integration.
Politics of Disunity

It is no secret that the central Alliance Party has been suffering
from a cancerous affliction known as disaffection.

As early as 1959»

trouble began to brew when Dr. Lim Chong Eu, the President of the MCA
protested the inequitable allocation of seats for a forthcoming election.
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He had. made a request for 40 but was allowed 28 by the Alliance National
Council.

He remarked, then, that:

The fear of Malayans of other racial origins— Chinese,
Indians, Eurasians— is simply one of fear of Malay communalism....The fear still remains and it is kept alive by the
provision of the constitution, which allows amendment of the
constitution with a two-thirds majority.^
An ultimatum was finally sent to the Tunku:

either the MCA was allowed

35 seats or it would contest the election under its own banner.

The

T^hku issued a reply that did not disguise any conciliatory effort.
The allocation for the MCA was subsequently raised to 31* but the extent
of the rift had been too wide for Dr, Lim to be appeased by the after
thought.

He resigned shortly thereafter and later formed the United

Democratic Party to channel opposition against the Alliance's educational
policies.
The Tunku, himself, had temporarily resigned in 1959 to undertake
reparation of the Party for the election.

Ominously, he pronounced that

"The real danger facing the Alliance is not from the opposition.
not fear their challenges.

I do

The real danger is from the Alliance itself."

2

After the formation of Malaysia, the sources of crises are expanded
with added responsibilities.

UMNO, which has appointed itself the

patriarch, is now to have to accomodate several other progenies from
the distant East.

This soon proved to be a domestic chore for which

it is rather ill-equipped.

On several occasions, it has stooped to the

tactical practice of pulling rank to resolve intra-party conflicts.

^Straits TimeB, 10 July 1959» P» 16, cited by Gordon Paul Means,
Malaysian Politics (London: University of London Press, 1970), p. 212.
2

Straits Times, 12 February 1959» P» 1 & 7, cited by Means, op. cit.,
p. 211.
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The resignations of Donald Stephens and Stephen Kalong Ningkan from the
Chief Ministerial posts in Sabah and Sarawak, respectively, were thus
precipitated in the mid-60's.
The Alliance cadre is prone to the kind of emotionalism that is
unbecoming of a leader.

The 'old guards' have not been reasonably

receptive to criticism or opposition; instead they invoke hegemony to
evoke compliance.

Many of the dissidents have been ousted or eased out

of the organization:

those who sense the adverse consequences to their

own future have chosen to purr intead of bark.
given the guise of cohesion.

The Party is, residually,

And a cynical conclusion that would not

be difficult to entertain is that the euphoria for having snuffed the
fire may have blinded the elite to the smoldering.
The emotionality of the Alliance cadre was never more evident than
in the period immediately surrounding the 1969 communal violence.

Even

as the party was returned to power, albeit with deflated support, the
leaders reacted in the surly manner that would convey the impression
that they had been dealt.a total defeat.

1

This behavior could be

understood, not excused, in light of the fact that, since birth, the
Party has been pampered by never having to experience defeat.

Ready to

lynch a scapegoat and propagate their comraunalist ideology, the few

'ultras' within it hastily pointed am accusing finger at the MCA for
making a poor showing at the polls.

Implicit was the suggestion that

without it UMNO would have gained a more decisive victory.

The Tunku

■)
The Alliance won 66 out of the 104 seats and 48.41 per cent of
the vote in West Malaysia in 1569* In addition, 10 seats were won
uncontested in Sabah. PMIP won 12 seats, Peoples' Progressive Party
14 seats, Gerakan Party 8 seats, and the Democratic Action Party 10
seats.
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was, also, ridiculed as a Sinophile.
The most audible voice to denounce the Tunku was that of Dr.
Mahathir, an Alliance member of Parliament, who called for his resig
nation with a letter and a petition for which he mustered the support
of the Malay students of the University of Malaya.

This is the very

kind of setback which the leadership, thus far, has not conditioned
itself to accommodate with objectivity; the Tunku ordered the immediate
expulsion of the man from the Party.

Dr.

Mahathir, however, was a

respected intellect and the students rallied behind him, reverberating
his demands across the campus.

After all, they too have had their

grievances against the Administration.

Dr. Mahathir subsequently wrote

a book entitled The Malay Dilemma which was promptly banned in Malaysia
based on the justification that it was provocative literature.

The

conduct of the government in the entire matter disenchanted the intelli
gentsia and the rest of the Malay masses, transporting them further
towards alienation.
The internal struggles of the Alliance snowballed, invariably
weakening the Party at each turn.

The MCA and the MIC declared their

intention, in the heat of the riots, to abstain from participation in
the cabinet although it shall remain in the Alliance.

While the corna*^

nalists in UMMO lauded this action, the moderates, who persist as the
power wielders in the Alliance, were not ready for this drastic rear
rangement of the Party decor.

The deliberate exclusion of Thin Tan Siew

Sin from the Cabinet at that critical point would have been a severe
laceration on the political kinship between the UMNO and the MCA.

Not

only is he a direct descendant of the founding fathers of his party
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and. the Alliance but he is also the most prominent Chinese in the cadre
and one who is well-liked and accepted by many Malays.

He was restored

to his former position as Minister of Finance but resigned in April,
1974» on the grounds of failing health.

His departure does not merely

create a void in the Cabinet but, more importantly, it also enervates
the already receding ties between UMNO and the MCA.
The Tunku himself resigned in September 1970 when it was made plain
to him that he no longer claimed the confidence of the majority of the
Malay populace.

The personal weaknesses he displayed towards the end

of his reign superseded the many historic deeds that he had performed
for the nation.

But, in the political process, this form of turnover

is as common as it is dreaded.
The leadership transition was relatively peaceful with Tun Abdul
Razak assuming the position of Prime Minister and appointing a close
friend and associate, Tun Dr. Ismail, as his Deputy.

The latter was

an experienced and able politician who had consistently maintained a
moderate posture vis-a-vis the non-Malays.
away in 1973*

Unfortunately, he passed

The Prime Minister has found himself drawing increasingly

on the services of newer and younger political aspirants whose appen
dage to the Party lacks the link of sentimentality characteristic of
his fellow pioneers.

What this will do in terms of bridging the intra-

party cleavages and those between the Party and the masses will be put
to the test at the general elections scheduled to take place in 1974*
In the final analysis, what has been revealed by the brief survey
of the intra-party politics is the pressing need for the bridging of
the multiple rifts threatening the decomposition of the Alliance.

Only
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after the Party itself has achieved a measurable level of integration
will political integration be a meaningful objective within its com
petence.

Its conduct as a party is projected on its performance as

a government.

Unfortunately, it took a bloodstained catharsis in 1969

to make the Party more circumspect.

Significance of the 1969
Communal Violence

The communal violence of 1969 was a historic point in Malaysian
politics that bore a strange irony.

On the One hand, it was massively

destructive, materially and psychologically, especially to middleMalaysians.

On the other hand, however, it was a functional phenomenon

in that it sensitized the Alliance leadership as well as other politicians
to the societal truisms that they had constrantly eluded.

Most never

bothered to re-examine their role and efficacy in affecting the politi
cal life of the society; feedback was neither actively sought nor
effectively discharged in the decision making function.

Thus, preoc

cupied with grandiose plans for the nation of the future they myopically
neglected the people of the present.
The bitter lesson learned post facto, and upon the demise of the
laymen, is that political integration is not purchasable with the
granting of either political privileges or economic compensations.
Neither the Bumiputras nor the non-Malays would accept one without the
other.

Nor is political integration manifestly synonymous with poli

tical participation.

The incident further illustrated that integration

cannot be forged by the conjuration of an imaginary enemy such as the
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communists.

True, the terrorists still exist in the border jungles and

pose a lingering threat to the country; but, to hang every infliction on
'communist infiltrators' is a simplistic interpretation of complex
politics.

It is both irresolute and illusory.

Also, the nation was

made to realize that political integration for Malaysia is not deri
vable through a communal formula which indulges one ethnic category
and constrains others.

Lastly, except to the obstinate, it has driven

home the point that neither the victory nor the defeat of the Alliance
or any one party could resolve the problem of political integration.
Resolution could only be predicated on the collective effort of the
polity with the guidance of able leadership.

While governance could

be entrusted to a few, political integration requires the will and the
support of all, for any one group, at this vulnerable stage in Malaysian
politics, could subvert the entire contributions towards this end.
With these realizations lodged in their conscience, the Alliance
leaders finally braced themselves to make a long overdue gesture for a
'coalition' with their most prominent opponents, viz. the PMIP, the
Gerakan Party headed by Dr. Lira Chong Eu (formerly of the UDP) and the
Democratic Action Party.

At first, with the creation of the National

Operations Council (NOC) and the suspension of parliament upon declara
tion of emergency rule, many skeptical inferences were made in regard
to the confiscation of democracy.

But parliamentary rule was resumed

and with it the mobilization of efforts to establish a working rela
tionship with the Oppositions.

Through diplomatic agility the government

achieved this feat with the pledge of cooperation by the leaders of PMIP
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and the Gerakan at the national level.

The former, with its exclusively

Malay following and the latter, with a largely Chinese membership,
would give the Alliance a better sense of purpose maintaining its intercommunal position.

And the integration achieved at this height, if

sustained, will in time trickle to the grassroots.
Communalism as an ideology is obstructive to political integration.
In fact, by virtue of the demographic distribution of the population,
it is not even practicable beyond a limited sense and the confine^ of
ethnic boundaries.

Non-communalism is, on the other end of the con

tinuum, too idealistic a configuration to procure, especially in view
of the fact that the respective ethnic groups are too deeply entrenched
in certain primordial considerations.

The Alliance, from all vantage

points, has struck a happy medium in its inter-communal persuasion.
However, its brand of inter-communalism could stand a few revisions
beginning with the restructuring of the Alliance itself.

The diminutive

role played by the members of the MCA and MIC is no substantiation for
its claim to be integrative.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE ALLIANCE AND THE FOUR PROBLEM
AREAS OF MALAYSIAN INTEGRATION
As mentioned at the outset of this study, for Malaysia to attain
political integration, four levels of integrational problems have to be
contained, viz. interethnic, intra-ethnic, elite-mass and territorial.
At this juncture, the role played by the Alliance in countering these
social enigmas will be evaluated.

It should be borne in mind that these

are not disparate problem areas; as such, the activities of the Alliance
with regard to them are diffused and overlapping.

They will be dealt

with separately in the ensuing discussion merely as an analytical
expedience.
Intei'-ethnic Integration

The Alliance, by the terms of demography, ideally symbolizes the
'ought' of society, that no one ethnic group should exclusively dictate
and disseminate the socio-political rights of the multi-ethnic culture.
The Alliance, by the terms of indigenous history, is a traitorous
compromise of basic rights:

it reflects the cowardly acceptance, on

the part of the Malay elites, of the colonial sin.

And the Alliance,

by its own terms, is a merger of equals by default as opposed to popular
representation; its legitimacy, in this respect, is subject to skepticism.
With these inherent contradictions, it is little wonder that the
Alliance exudes the misunderstanding and is itself often misunderstood.
A government that is predicated on ambiguity cannot beget definitive
56
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results.

Enloe contends that, underlying the encouragement of cultural

pluralism and institutional pluralism, is the policy of procrastination;
the government is merely postponing judgment and perpetuating ambiguity.^
That the Alliance has tried cannot ever be doubted.

Most of its

leaders have conscientiously directed their energy towards promulgating
a progressive society.

However, as argued earlier, a society that is

progressive economically is not necessarily a society that is politically
integrated for the two are not synonymous.

Granted, for progress to take

place, a minimum amount of integration has to be present in the polity
because lacking this, a society either stagnates or regresses.

Minimal

integration is, nonetheless, an insufficient condition for ensuring the
viability of the nation.
The Alliance has hoped that the symbols of national unity which it
had initially introduced, e.g., the national anthem and language, would
suffice in bringing about such unity.

These symbols are being used in

other nations and, generally, they are effective provided the people
themselves have the will to cooperate with the leadership.

Such a will,

however, has either been consciously repressed or never evolved in the
political mind of the people.

The status of the national anthem, for

instance, has been reduced tc a mockery.

An accurate observation made

in this regard is that
The distance that must
can be considered as a
every evening in Kuala
a single member of the
foreign diplomat) will

be traversed before Malaysia
unified nation is demonstrated
Lumpur's Chinese cinemas where not
audience (except for an occasional
rise for the national anthem.^

^Enloe, op. cit., pp. 45-45*
p
"The Asian Sickness," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LVII
(December 14» 1967)» p. 508*
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The fate of the language as the symbol of unity has been protected
only by the legislative order which makes it mandatory for a student
completing his senior year in high school to obtain a passing grade in
Bahasa Malaysia before he is awarded a full diploma.

The non-Malays,

not surprisingly, construes this as another manifestation of authori
tarianism prejudicial to their interests.

One must, nevertheless,

sympathize with the government's position in this context.

The non-Malays

want their cake and eat it too; they have demanded all the rights of a
fully domiciled citizen while insisting on asserting their cultural
preferences regardless whether these obstruct the path of unity.

Even

the most democratic of leadership cannot tolerate this insolence and
maintain its integrity.
The application of language as an integrative factor is inadvertently
mitigated by the freedom allowed in various other cultural expressions.
Even though vernacular education has been permitted to continue with
drastic delimitations, for instance, the fact that it does exist in
organized form invariably and inevitably exposes successive generations
to and perpetuates communalism.

Yet the Alliance could only restrict

such education so far; to exceed the present constrictions is to evis
cerate the institutions and perpetrate a bloody battle for survival.
It is obvious that in attempting to integrate the various ethnic
groups the Alliance is working with limited resources; accordingly, its
achievements have been limited.

At times, those resources that are

available are not deployed with the best of strategies.

More often

than not the government is negligent about communicating with the masses
to enlighten them of their environing situation.

Knowledge may help
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to moderate fear but ignorance only reinforces it.

When masses are not

advised of but protected from the events of political significance, they
speculate and imagine the worst, and their enemy is always embodied in
an ethnic group other than their own.
To a certain degree, this paucity in communication stoked the major
communal violence which erupted in 1969*

About four days after the

crisis began, it was ruled that all news of the crisis were to be dis
seminated by the Information Coordinating Center (ICC) under the aegis
of the NOC.

The ICC, however, released "infrequent bulletins...couched

in repetitious generalities."^

It was further reported that "Rumors

contribute to tension because the Malaysian Government's official pro2
nouncements are believed by no one."
Subsequently, the 1948 Sedition
Act was amended to make the raising of issues that will incite communal
resentments a federal offense.

This enactment, in addition,

...prohibits utterances or printed statements which appear
to question (l) special position of Malays and other Indigenous
groups; (2) Malay as national language; (3) citizenship
rights of any ethnic group; and (4) rights and sovereignty
of Malay rulers.^
If the Alliance has hoped to foster integration by these legislative
actions, it has a considerable amount of reckoning to do and must
delete the erroneous premise.

The curtailment of the freedom of ex

pression does not promote congeniality between the ethnic groups;

1

Felix Gagliano, Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969s The Political
Aftermath (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies,
Southeast Asia Program, 1971 > P* 26.
2The_ Bulletin, Vol. XCI, no. 4661 (July 12, 1969)» P* 27, cited
by Gagliano, loc. cit., p. 27*
^Marvin Rogers, "Malaysia/Singapore: Problems and Challenges of
the Seventies," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, no. 2 (February 1971),pp. 122-123.
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instead, it breeds resentment, suspicion and distrust that are all

repressed.

At the sign of the slightest provocation, there is every

reason to believe that these emotions are going to prevail over commonsense.
Perhaps, the immediate result of such restraint is peaceful coex
istence.

But, as has been argued earlier, political integration of a

viable nature is cultivated; any situation which projects the semblance
of unity and materializes overnight must be suspect in terms of its
longevity.

The Alliance was not totally oblivious to the dangers.

The

party cadre espoused a plan for a Malaysian ideology or 'Rukunegara'
which advances five principles of national unity:

Belief in God, Loyalty

to the King and Country, Upholding the Constitution, Rule of Law and
Good Behavior and Morality.
While the timing of the gesture is of empirical interest, the
ideation which cradles the plan is neither original nor inspiring.

It

is a rehash of what any Malaysian of average intelligence could identify
as constituting some of the basic requirements for personal and the
higher level of political integration.

This marked another flight into

generality.
Enloe describes the Malaysian government's integrative strategy
as being two-pronged.
First, there has been an effort to leave the ultimate
vision of an eventually unified Malaysia relatively vague,
open to numerous interpretations. In addition, policy
makers have shown a distinct preference for proceeding
toward integration through gradualism and administrative
tinkering rather then by sweeping reform.1

1
Enloe, op. cit., p. 36.
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As indicated earlier, the main thrust of Alliance's policies has
been to propagate economic well-being.

While it is approaching its

destination quantitatively, the success has not delivered the nation's
populace to the desired level of inter-ethnic integration.

The statis

tical gains, however, "belie the fact that progress among the Bumiputras
has not "been in proportions that have been intended.

And the Bumiputras

are no longer satisfied with hollowed political privileges and platitudes
instead, they demand a greater share of material wealth for the assets
accruing to the non-Malays constitute their relative deprivation.

Some

where along the course of development, the zero-sum theory has been fed
into the psychological repertoire of the nation, to the detriment of
integration.
In the last analysis, inter-ethnic integration has not been suc
cessfully attained by the Alliance Party, at least not to the extent
and tenacity that would ensure the nation's longevity.

As in other

instances, there seem to be many reasons one could draw on for ration
alizing the situation.

In general, two broad explanations could facili

tate the understanding of the problem:
well-integrated as an institution.

(l) the Alliance itself is not

As such, it could only fall short

of being efficacious; and (2) the odds are higher against than for the
achievement of inter-ethnic integration.

By accident of history and

by recent developments, partly perpetrated by the Alliance and partly
circumstantial, the forces operating against the Party often exceed
its competence.
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Intra-ethnic Integration
The area of intra-ethnic integration is a delicate one to the
extent that it underlines the alienation of peoples within the same
communal group.

To a large degree, the problems defined in this context

approximate those in the area of elite-mass integration.

There are

many similarities between the factors that precipitate intra-ethnic
dissonance and the ones that effect elite-mass disparity.
The focal point of intra-ethnic differences is the lack of consensus
in regard to values.

In each ethnic group, there is always a small

contingent of elites who are almost invariably the products of Western
education and who have wittingly adopted a Western life style.

At the

other extreme of the hierarchy are the sizeable masses still deeply
entrenched in the conservative, ethnic modes of living.

Their attitudes

towards some facets of modernization have yet to undergo a time-consuming
process of permutation before they are reconciliable to those of the
elites.
These groups of individuals who are mostly illiterate or semi
illiterate are often easily swayed by rhetoric, particularly the type
that is charged with primordial sentiments.

Their choices in politics,

in short, are predisposed to irrationality.

Thus, those leaders who

can convincingly claim to 'speak their language' can go to them directly
for support.

The PMIP, for one, has effectively exploited the religious

values of the Malays in traditionally very conservative areas of West
Malaysia.

Others who cannct purport to have strong affinities require

active services of 'intermediaries', usually individuals who have won
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the respect and confidence of their local communities.
cadre belong mainly to the second category.

The Alliance

This is especially true

of those in the UMNO.
The impact of intra-ethnic cleavages has been projected most
conspicuously in the last general election.

The loss of electoral seats

by the MCA was the reflection of the waning support given by the Chinese
to its leadership.
the MCA.

This, in turn, mirrored the lack of confidence in

The Chinese had strengthened their own belief that the party

has betrayed them by not adequately advancing their interests to the
government.
The threat to intra-ethnic integration comes not only from those
on the lowest rungs of the society but also from the restive individuals
perched on the margin between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'.

Such

individuals are resentful of the destitute in their respective communi
ties for their fatalistic acceptance of their lot in society.

At the

same time, they are disenchanted with the leaders for seemingly with
holding the wealth for themselves and for not having alleviated the
sufferings of their own people.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the marginal individuals or middleMalaysians play a catalytic role in the determination of the nation's
future.

They are generally young and of varying levels of educational

attainment.

Being widely scattered, they may not be the source of

substantial votes to any single candidate but should not be evaded
only for this reason.

In fact, they are the ones that the leadership

must reach because they stand at the crossroads not only of intra-ethnic
but all aspects of integration.
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The Alliance has been conscious of this need to tap such sources
or at least keep them in political perspective.

The UMNO Youth Organi

zation, the MCA Youth Organization and other such movements constitute
a collectivized effort to channel energy and creativity into keeping
the spirit of the community alive.

However, this form of activity

cannot avoid intensifying communalism which is, in turn, inimical to
the cause of inter-ethnic integration.
The most critical intra-ethnic chasms have been found in the Alliance
Party organization itself.

Within each of the three main ethnic branches

factionalism has, at one point or another, threatened the very founda
tion of the organization.

UMNO had been the stage for the polarization

of the 'ultras' and the 'moderates'.

The former were, to varying degrees,

sympathetic to the Pan-Malaysian union envisioned by Soekarno and his
cohorts.

What these individuals were striving for was not a Malaysian

Malaysia but a Malay Malaysia.

They wanted to mobilize the Malays to

the position of unassailable and unequivocal supremacy.

Thus, they

were highly critical of UMNO's concessions to the non-Malays.

The

moderates, meanwhile, were set on maintaining at least the semblance
of inter-communalism in the Alliance and in the policies enacted by the
Party.
Similarly, there have been conflicts within the MCA and MIC between
the 'reformers' and the 'old guards'.

In late 1966, Sim Mow Yu, an

MCA youth leader was ejected from party membership.

Sim, who was the

head of the Chinese School Teachers Association, had expressed a
resentful view of the language policies of the government as recommended
by the Razak and the Talib Reports.

As recently as 1973»
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An intra-party faction fight between 'reformers' and
those ranged behind the veteran Tan Siew Sin...broke out
publicly with the announcement on June 8 that a reform
movement within the MCA had been inaugurated....Lin Keng
Yaik, a leader of the reform faction...and the reformers
alleged that Tan Siew Sin and his party beterans were
allowing the Chinese case to go by default through inadequate
presentation of their point of view in government deliberatios.
On August 9 Tan Siew Sin expelled several of the rebels....^
In the MIC, the intra-ethnic conflict took the form of a scramble for
leadership between the party veterans, Tun V.T. Sambathan and Tan Sri
Manickavasagam, with victory for the latter in 1973» and, purportedly,
for Indian economic reforms.
On the one hand, the cleavages just described are construable as
nothing more than intra-party conflicts that support the contention
that the Alliance Party itself is malintegrated.

But, in a real sense,

these discordances reflect the intra-ethnic differences regarding the
role that each community should play in the functions of the polity.
There are some in each group who are resigned to the Malay special
position and to the inter-communalism promulgated by the Alliance as
fait accomplis. There are also others among them who would challenge
Malay primacy and seek to be partners whose equality is more than just
lip-service.

And finally, there is a miniscule faction in the larger

communities who believe in the narrowest form of communalism that
precludes participation by all others but those belonging to their own
group.
There are other more peculiar differences within each ethnic group.
Each community has its own pluralism of culture.

It is estimated that

1

"Malaysia," Far Eastern Economic Review 1974 Yearbook, p. 208.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
there are at least five commonly spoken Chinese dialects— Cantonese,
Hokkien, Teochew, Hakka and Hailam— and nine Indian dialects.
generic term Malay is, also, deceiving.

The

About the only point in common

that the Malays of West Malaysia and East Malaysia have, culturally,
is their profession of Islam as a religious preference.

Among those

defined as Chinese or Indians, there is not even this coterminality.
There are many Chinese who are Buddhists while others are Christians,
of several denominations, or pagans.
and Christians.

The Indians are mainly Hindus

While these internal cultural variations are signifi

cant in intra-ethnic considerations, they are not as menacing as
politically-induced ones and do not portend a veritable threat to their
communal existence.
It may be concluded that, at least through primitive empiricism,
the Alliance Party has managed to contain the environing obstacles to
intra-ethnic integration.

As mentioned earlier, the cooptation of

'congenial' leaders of opposition communal and allegedly non-communal
parties into a working coalition have been successfully undertaken by
the ruling elites, thus constellating the diverse intra-ethnic political
viewpoints.

However, the settlement of intra-ethnic disputes have

not always been amicable.

The methods employed for removing recal

citrants have, at times, verged on the realm of extra-constitutionality.
Intra-ethnic integration, in general, is less than a formidable task
to the Party cadre.

There are, to begin with, factors of ethnicity

that will always tend to hold each community, albeit loosely, together.
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Elite-Mass Integration
The problem of elite-mass integration is not restricted, to Malaysian
politics; rather, it is a commonplace in the new nations and often
prevails in older ones.

It is only peculiar to the extent that, in

the multiplicity of its ethnic constituents; the elite-mass cleavage
cuts not along but across ethnic lines.

However, it must be clarified

that although the elites have a coterminality of interests, they are
not to be presumed as being integrated.
It is suggested by Myron Weiner that more important than the attitudinal gap between the governors and the governed is the question of
the attitude of the government towards its citizens.

1

In this regard,

Grossholtz writes:

The language of politics (in Malaysia) is the language of
the pulpit, exhorting the electorate to stay united, work
hard, appriciate what the government has done, trust the
leaders.... Inherent is the idea that the government knows
best and will carry out programs to accomplish the common
welfare.^
Growwholtz could not have been more precise for it is not a mere
image that the Alliance government is constrictively paternalistic.
Especially prior to the communal violence which shook the Party out of
its political trance, communication with the masses have been sporadic
and unilateral.

The government has a knack for tuning off feedback

expecially those that are not amenable to its policies.

More often

than not, popular opinions are not being pursued.

Weiner, op. cit., p. 61.
2

Grossholtz, op. cit., p. 337.
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It stands to reason that this state of affairs cannot he prolonged
without spurring public resentment.

It has been posited that

The mere existence of differences in goals and values
between the governing elite and the governed mass hardly
constitutes disintegration as long as those who are ^
governed accept the right of the governors to govern.
2

The diminishing mandate afforded the Alliance at the last (1969) polls
is indicative of the fact that this right is being widely questioned.
The Alliance would have to make amendments, allowing the public more
credibility in the conduct of politics.
Recognizing this fact yet unprepared for mass involvement in dia
lectics, the government implemented the National Consultative Council
in 1970, congregating some 60 members of the government, the opposition,
civil servants, and representatives of religious, business and other
dominant institutions.

The Council is encouraged to discuss issues

that nourish discontentment within and among communities to promote
"intercommunal cooperation, social integration, and the growth of a
Malaysian sense of national identity."^

Cyncically, one could dismiss

this move as 'noblesse oblige'; the people drawn into the Council are,
moreover, not from the grassroots.

But, if the government has found

itself lacking the capacity to engage in direct dialogue with the
masses thus far, this is indeed an unpretentious measure of cybernetics.

•)
Weiner, op. cit., p. 60.
2In 1964, the Alliance Party won 89 out of the 104 parliamentary
seats for West Malaysia and 58-3 per cent of the popular vote. In
1969* the Party Becured only 66 seats and 49 Per cent of the vote.
^Rogers, op. cit., p. 122.
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The differences underlying the divergences between the elites
and. the masses are manifestly couched in the scheme of values, trans
cending ethnicity*

While the masses are encouraged or compelled to

comply with governmental policies, particularly in the areas of language
and education, the elites display little effort to minimize their
veneration of things Western, including the English language.

They

enroll their children in foreign schools and universities where they
adopt not only the knowledge but also the alien way of life, removing
themselves further from the masses and accentuating the lines of stra
tification.
In conclusion, while the government cannot be vindicated for the
laxity in elite-mass communication, many other manifestations of the
elite-mass gap are products of societal evolution that are beyond the
preventive means of the Alliance unless it exercises the tools of
oppression.

Undeniably, some of the champions of Bahasa Malaysia are

guilty of contributing to the preservation of die colonial legacies
by sponsoring the education of their progenies in English-speaking
countries.

Their action, however, has been rationalized, and justifiably

so, on the grounds that the pursuit of advanced education for the amelio
ration of society must outweigh immediate communal interests.

Also

justifiably, from the viewpoint of the masses, this has created a
credibility gap.

For the Alliance as a ruling body, the primary concern

must be to foster elite-mass integration through establishing better
reciprocal communication between itself and the citizens.

Towards this

realization it has taken a modest but commendable initiative.
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Territorial Integration

The problem of territorial integration for Malaysia, as suggested.
earlier, pertains mainly to the political synthesis between its Western
and more developed region and the Eastern wing of the nation.

The

challenges posed by this problem are thus pertinent not so much to issue
of the viability of the nation, although ultimately it would arrive at
that, but to the immediate question of the viability of the federation.
Theoretically, "In time the control over territory may be accompanied
by a feeling of common nationality...but there must first of all be
1
territorial integration."
For the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak, the termination of British
colonial rule in their native land, the gaining of their sovereignty
and the reallignment with another Asian country occurred simultaneously
and perhaps a little too rapidly for them to gain their political bearing.
Latent politicians enterprisingly availed of the opporutunity which
this situation presented to create political parties purportedly to
defend local interests.

Most of these parties were sufficiently

impressed by the intentions of the Alliance Party to form their own
regional alliances rallied behind the central government.
For Sabah and Sarawak, there were cogent reasons to persuade
acquiescence to the merger plans even if they had had strong misgivings
initially.

About the time that the

merger was in the offing, the

Philippines pronounced its claim on Sabah, invoking the mandate of the

1 .
Weiner, op. cit., p. 57.
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Sultan of Sulu.

Soekarno, then, occupied the stage, first with his

verbal denunciations of the proposal and, subsequently, with armed
aggression.

The British may not have instituted sweeping reforms for

modernization in both the states, but their administration was perceived
as benevolent.

With Soekarno's designs of Pan-Malaysianism, it was

doubtful if he would have been equally disposed to the populace, par
ticularly those of Chinese origin.
It would not be accurate to argue that the peoples of Sabah and
Sarawak acted under duress although they did have compelling reasons
to pitch their support in the merger.

They saw in Malaysia a satis

factory pluralist structure for the safeguard of the future.

Thus, it

is imperative that inter-communalism persevere; political communalism
will defeat the fundamental intent of the merger.
To allay the basic fears of East Malaysians, mainly in those areas
to which West Malaysians have been sensitive such as language and special
rights, the government expanded the competence of Article 153 to embrace
all the tribal groups defined as 'indigenous'. In regard to the lan
guage issue, while 1967 was set as the target date for implementing
Bahasa Malaysia as the official language in West Malaysia, East Malaysia
was allowed a grace period to end in 1973*

The Malaysianization of the

civil services was, further, allowed to proceed at a lesser velocity.
Freedom of religious expression is permitted as in West Malaysia with
a slight difference:

while Islam has been declared as the official

religion in West Malaysia, this piece of legislation was waived in
the case of the East.
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Apparently, these have not been effective stimuli for territorial
integration.

The special rights, it has been charged, have not been

equitably maintained; a specific charge that the Malays in Sarawak enjoy
preferential treatment in the allocation of development funds as opposed
to other indigenous groups has been levelled at the central government.^
With regard to the question of language, Bahasa Malaysia has been an
integral part of the West Malaysian culture by virtue of being the mother
tongue of the Malays.

In East Malaysia, the lingua franca is adulterated

or 'bazaar' Malay while the purer form of the language is quite alien
to the masses.

Facility of usage could only evolve slowly.

In terms

of the Malaysianization plan, East Malaysia lacks the manpower to fill
most of the positions vacated by the repatriation of the colonial
officers.

They do not cherish the idea of having West Malaysians invade

their civil service and neither are the West Malaysians generally enthu
siastic about serving in that region.
Because the Alliance government is highly centralized, Sabah and
Sarawak affairs are discussed and determined in Kuala Lumpur instead
of in Kota Kinabalu (the capital of Sabah) or Kuching (the capital of
Sarawak).

The Alliance feels comfortable with this centralization of

power because it generally allows the leadership to dictate the allo
cation of resources on its own political terms.

This arrangement has

worked well prior to the merger when the Alliance needed only to control
the eleven states of mainland Malaya where there is widespread know
ledge of one another.

1
"Winter of Discontent," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LVIII,
no. 6 (November 9, 1967), p. 2^6.
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But a formula that has long been accepted in West Malaysia has
invoked resentment in East Malaysia.

The Easterners are disturbed by

the fact that their lives are being manipulated by the claws of an
invisible government.

The highhanded manner with which the Alliance

cadre handled the disputes involving Donald Stephens, then Chief Mini
ster of Sabah, and Stephen Kalong Ningkan, then Chief Minister of Sarawak,
mainly for questioning the policies of the central clique toward their
respective states, reinforced the fear of oppression in East Malaysia.
In 1969i the Alliance government made another move that was con
strued as contradictory to democratic principles.

Upon the outbreak

of violence in West Malaysia, the administration issued a restraining
order to postpone the election that was in process in East Malaysia.
Observers were inclined to interpret the step as a strategy to prevent
the excessive loss of seats in that area.

These and other reasons

such as the superiority complex of West Malaysians in their relation
ship with their Eastern counterparts have mitigated the efforts geared
specifically towards promoting territorial integration.

Ongkili is

only optimistic when he concluded that "The 1970's should experience
fewer problems and an increasing understanding of the process of
federalism anc. a lessening of regional feelings."

1

It would not be unreasonable to speculate that the lack of such
understanding emanates from the fact that federalism, in the general
sense of the word, does not operate in the Malaysian government.

1
Ongkili, op. cit., p. 37.
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"Federalism has been used in the Federation of Malaya," it is argued,
"but unitananism to govern."

1

In assessing the events leading up to the present, one could only
conclude that territorial integration of East Malaysia has not been
substantially obtained by the Alliance.

By the last count, there are

two East Malaysians serving in the Federal Cabinet.
concessions do not make territorial integration.

But these minor

In fact, territorial

integration cannot be achieved as long as (l) the Alliance's blueprint
of federalism is not adequately revised to relinguish some of the powers
of central to the state governments; (2) the special rights of the
indigenous are not equitably safeguarded and transformed into economic
progress, and (3) East Malaysians are not treated and respected as
equals by the leaders and the peoples of West Malaysia.

The attitudinal

change required is the function of political socialization for which
the government should necessarily assume responsibility.

Summary

The preceding overview has revealed that the Alliance Party has
not satisfactorily rectified all the problematic, indeed sometimes
exacerbated some, aspects of integration.

It must be concluded, there

fore » that political integration has not been substantively attained
by the Party.
attainment:

There are two ostensible factors that have impeded such
(l) the ineptitude of the Alliance Party emanating from

the fact that its organizational structure is not cohesive; and

1
Grossholtz, op. cit., p. 327•
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(2) the accelerated growth in the economic and the educational institu
tions and mobilization of political participation have inspired the
curiosity and articulation by the masses to question the disparities
that these have elicited.
coin.

There is however, the other side of the

The Malaysian polity is fraught with inherent cleavages many of

which are not conducive to integration in the immediate future.
In the last analysis, it is not so much that inter-communalism
is non-effectual for it would be maintained that, at least momentarily,
it is the most practical political formula in contrast to communalism
and non-communalism.

Rather, inter-communalism within the Alliance

Party itself has not been effectively exercised; thus, the inter-commu
nalism.

Rather, inter-communalism within the Alliance Party itself has

not been effectively exercised; thus, the inter-communalism which it
tries to superimpose on the polity cannot be effective.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

The problems of integration for Malaysia are visibly compounded,
by diverse variables, some generated by accidents of the historical
past and devolved to successive generations while others are imputable
only to present political leadership or lack of it.
The catalyst of malintegration in the Malaysian society is its
pluralism.

Like a cancerous infliction, the problem may have had a

chance of being remedied conclusively at its infancy.

But, the coloni

alists, or, for that matter, the Malays, had no premonition (or wittingly
ignored it) that the multiethnicity they brewed was to ferment into a
phenomenon as potent as that which presently threatens the viability
of the nation.
It was, indeed, a tarnished society that the Alliance Party
inherited from its governing predecessors.

Clearly, the Party assumed

command with a severe handicap; guidance of a neophyte nation is demanding
in itself without the corrupting legacies of historical indiscretion.
However, one cannot extricate the Alliance just as one cannot overlook
the part played by the British in perpetrating the poli tical disjunctures in Malaysia.

The executive role consigns responsibility to the

Party while investing it with power.

The Alliance is, therefore,

morally obligated to demonstrate as well as exercise leadership to
harmonize the centrifugal elements of the society.
As apparent through the preceding discussion of the Alliance

76
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operations, however, the Party leaders are prone to discharging the kind
of leadership that is fused with authoritarianism released by emotion
alism.

Their capability for moral leadership in an exemplary capacity

is limited on account that the Party is fraught with infrastructural
cleavages that are tangible to the masses.

A Party of such demeanor

cannot effectually integrate the polity which it purports to lead.
What the Alliance has achieved for the society since its investi
ture are, theoretically, the dynamics of development:

economic progress,

educational advancement, and mass political participation.

Yet, the

society is less politically stable today than it was at the outset of
independence.

This

is due, ostensibly, to the fact that the proceeds

of that development have not been meted out equitably among the con
tending ethnic groups.
The Alliance's manifest leadership function is to promote the eco
nomy of the Bumiputras while expanding the political privileges of the
non-Bumiputras to attain a socio-economic equilibrium that would abate
political tensions.

What it has done, in effect is to increase both

the economic and political well-being of the non-Bumiputras in greater
proportion and more rapidly than what is materially accomplished for
augmenting the economic base of the Bumiputras.

Meanwhile, the policies

designed and displayed appear, semantically, to be overly solicitous
towards Bumiputras, causing concern and disaffection among non-Bumiputras.
In substance, however, the policies have backfired in that the advance
ment of the Bumiputras lag behind that of the non-Bumiputras, agitating
the former and reinforcing their resentment towards the latter.
Consequently, instead of attaining an increasing amount of integration,
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the society may, in fact, have been dissolving some of the cohesiveness
that pre-existed.
In retrospect, the Alliance has, perceivably, tried to institute
widespread institutional reforms which exacerbate the integrational
problems because they accentuate inter-ethnic disparities simultaneously,
thus allowing the leaders little opportunity for attending to each
cleavage before it transcends manageability.

A combination of the

'blitzkrieg' strategy and Fabianism, perhaps, would have been more
efficacious.

Incrementalism affords ruling elites regular intervals

wherein to review and assess their programs and determine whether any
group or ethnic community is being alienated and showing disaffection
toward the government or any other community.

A government which con

fines its attention to vertical growth risks losing sight of horizontal
relevance, and the Alliance has fallen into this empirical trap.
In the language of Deutsch, bilateral communications have to be
developed between the government and the governed to effect under
standing and cohesion.
start.

Towards this end, the Alliance has made a modest

Weiner and Levine have suggest the significance of political

socialization in fostering a community of attitudes among members of a
society.

This is the task of political leaders; in terms of performing

this function the Alliance has demonstrated a lack of aptitude.
While the Alliance has failed to achieve a meaningful amount of
political integration for the Malaysian society, it is pertinent to
contemplate whether integration is attainable and, if so, by what
formula.
At this juncture in Malaysian politics, inter-ethnic disparities
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are more conspicuous especially because there is a growing class of
articulate and informed masses who are politically conscious and obser
vant of social realities.

On the one hand, this is a mark of develop

ment as the masses increasingly make demands upon the system that becomes
progressively difficult, quantitatively and qualitatively, to satisfy.
These demands appear even more inordinate when they are articulated by
two competing ethnic blocs— the indigenous and the non-indigenous— whose
interests are, generally, diametrically opposed, and will remain so as
long as the 'constant pie1 syndrome prevails.
In view of the repelling circumstances, speculations have been
audible with regard to the activity of the military as a contender for
political primacy.

Since the riots of 1969* the Alliance government has

formulated a comradely working relationship with the military's top
brass.

In fact, to many foreign observers, the riots woke the sleeping

giant; and, a military regime is not a novelty in that region of the
world.

However, the military in Malaysia is not dominated by any one

ethnic group.

While the niche at the vertex is the privilege of a

Malay, a rough distribution of ranking personnel is such that the
Malays command the army, an Indian directs the navy, and, while the
chief of the air force is a Malay, many of his pilot officers are Chinese.
Given this pluralism, the military, if it were to assume the executive
stance in the foreseeable future, could only reconstitute inter-commu
nalism as a governing policy.
And inter-communalism will never foster the highest deaired and
attainable level of integration.

By its very nature, it supports the

equal rights of the ethnic groups and is obliged to safeguard these
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rights as impartially as possible.

In doing so, it invariably perpe

tuates extant disparities, thus causing or reviving disaffection and
resentment among one group toward another.

The alternative— communalism—

is not a pragmatic solution for cultivating political integration while
it may produce a semblance of cohesiveness through coercion.

In light

of the multiethnicity of the society, coercion could only be effected
with the cooperation of a unified military and, possible, exogenous
assistance.

However, even if such an oppressive tactic is operational,

the governing body could be no more than ephermal for it will eventually
trigger a massive conflict involving interested foreign factions.
ideal— non-communalism— could only remain an ideal.

Thfe

There are too many

inherent cultural differences between ethnic groups to render such a
solution practicable.
Given the contradictions that beset its society, a cogent con
clusion is that inter-communalism is Malaysia's option for survival.
Paradoxically, if it follows this route, Malaysia will not achieve the
highest level of observable political integration,

Moralistically, one

can advance the argument that partial success in cultivating political
integration is more worthwhile than complete attainment of coerced
integration, for only with the former can Malaysia survive as a nation.
If one accepts the contention that inter-communalism is the answer
to Malaysia's quest for integration, then, it may be asked why the
Alliance, professing inter-communalism, has failed to achieve a sub
stantial level of political integration.

The explanation lies,

ostensibly, in the fact that there is a discrepancy between the intercommunalism that the Party professes and that which it practices.
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The Alliance is not, as supposedly, an association of equals, with the
waning role of the MCA and the diminutive role of the MIC.

Only after

a reorientation towards equitability will the Party he able to apply
its philosophy as a national ideology.

In short, the Party has the

right 'political formula' but its ingredients will need an improvement
in quality.
In the final analysis, it is difficult to visualize the obliteration
of a nation that is thriving economically just as it is difficult to
envision its total integration emanating from an amicable spirit of
political identification.

What is easier perceived is its survival,

perhaps not as a paradigm of integration, but with enduring countenance
that will outlive the Alliance Party.
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